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Modern Ireland, even after its recent economic troubles, is a highly devel-oped nation. It is a member of the 
European Union and the euro zone and had 
a GDP per capita of 126% of the EU average. 
While Actual Individual consumption in lower 
than this it is still a very respectable 97% of the 
EU average.
This is a recent development. One econom-
ic historian has pointed out that over the 20th 
century to the late 1950s, not only were people 
leaving the country, those who stayed did not 
experience a significant improvement in their 
standard of living. Indeed, Ireland has moved 
from an outlier in terms of underdevelopment 
to the other side of the curve and my purpose 
here today is to attempt to explain why, with 
a particular focus on its engagement with 
the process of European integration. Ireland, 
like many small nations has had a difficult 
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relationship with its larger neighbour. In fact 
between the arrival of the Normans in 1169 
and the achievement of independence in 1922, 
it was in part or in whole subject to the rule of 
England and later Britain, and of course today 
the northern part of the island is still part of 
the United Kingdom. This relationship did not 
work to Ireland’s advantage.
Following the great famine in the 1840s, 
Ireland suffered more than a century of eco-
nomic and population decline. In 1841, the 
population of what is now the Republic of Ire-
land was 6.52 million. By 1901 it had fallen 
to 3.22 million and despite a high birth rate, 
by 1961, it had fallen further to 2.81 million. 
Between 1841 and 1961, the population of 
England rose from 13.65 million to 41. 15 mil-
lion and that population experienced a signifi-
cantly higher standard of living than that of 
Ireland.
This unhappy experience within the United 
Kingdom was a key factor in energising a new 
generation of Irish nationalists in the early 
twentieth century. Following a war of inde-
pendence the southern portion of Ireland ob-
tained its independence from Britain in 1922.
However Independence did not bring a ma-
jor change in economic fortunes.
A number of factors drove this poor per-
formance. First was the predominant depend-
ence of the economy on agriculture with a very 
large number of small farms. Second was the 
disturbed political and economic environment 
including a civil war, the great depression, eco-
nomic tensions with Britain, and the Second 
World War. Third, however, was an excessive 
reliance on protectionism and import substi-
tution. Following a short dalliance with free 
trade, Ireland moved to an economic system 
focussed on building domestic industries be-
hind high tariff walls. Unfortunately, this pol-
icy failed to produce a dynamic industrial sec-
tor and the failure to catch the European boom 
of the 1950s as Ireland clung to clearly outdat-
ed economic protectionism led to high emigra-
tion and poor growth. Kenneth Whitaker, the 
Secretary of the Department of Finance and 
the driving force behind the coming change in 
economic policy, in a note to the Government 
in 1957 wrote.
“It is accepted on all sides that we have come 
to a critical and decisive point in our economic 
affairs. It is only too clear that the policies we 
have hitherto followed have not resulted in a 
viable economy. It is equally clear that we face 
economic decay and the collapse of our politi-
cal independence if we elect to shelter perma-
nently behind a protectionist blockade. For 
this would mean accepting that our costs must 
permanently be higher than those of other 
countries, both in industry and large sections 
of agriculture. That would be a policy of de-
spair… The effect of any policy which entailed 
relatively low living standards here would be 
to sustain and stimulate the outflow of emi-
grants and make it impossible to preserve the 
26 Counties as an economic entity.”
This stark reality, combined with a chang-
ing of the political guard, when Eamon de 
Valera made way for Sean Lemass as Taoiseach 
(Prime Minister), set the conditions for a radi-
cal change in national economic policy. This 
involved reducing the barriers to free trade, 
encouraging foreign firms to base themselves 
in Ireland and an expansion in State invest-
ment in support of development, particularly 
in the areas of Education, infrastructure and 
urban development. Ireland’s education system 
was, at that time particularly underdeveloped.
There was however no great enthusiasm for 
a return to a fully free trade environment. Ire-
land’s previous experience under British rule 
had left a sour taste in that regard. The appli-
cation of free trade principles during the Great 
Irish Famine had left a very vivid impression 
on the public mind. While there are differing 
views amongst historians, I can testify from my 
own childhood that there was a near universal 
belief that Britain had done too little, too late 
to help the victims of the famine which deci-
mated the population of the country.
Those of you who read James Joyce’s Ul-
ysses will come across a speech by the Citizen 
condemning the woeful effects of British rule. 
“Where are our missing twenty millions of Irish 
should be here today instead of four, our lost 
tribes? And our potteries and textiles, the fin-
est in the whole world!” While Joyce has some 
fun at the Citizen’s expense there is little doubt 
that many people then and now in Ireland 
МИРОВАЯ ЭКОНОМИКА
95
believed that a free trade environment without 
a broader framework of support meant that 
Ireland would suffer while the larger countries, 
and the larger neighbour in particular, pros-
pered. Indeed as recently as the 1980s, when 
discussing the idea of a single currency, a for-
mer Governor of the Irish Central Bank, Mau-
rice Doyle, said that there was a risk Ireland 
could become the Appalachia of Europe.
From the beginning, therefore, as well as 
opening the economy, Ireland sought new po-
litical partners in its quest for development. 
In the first thirty years of independence, the 
United Kingdom had taken ninety percent of 
Ireland’s exports. Ireland also tied its curren-
cy to Sterling making the country dependent 
economically on its near neighbour. Once the 
country decided to adopt an open trading ap-
proach, in the framework of an economic plan, 
Ireland also began to look for an international 
context in which it could pursue its develop-
ment. While the European Economic Commu-
nity had been agreed before the new Irish pol-
icy was adopted, it is interesting to note that 
Ireland did not join the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA), an organisation founded 
by those who were inherently uncomfortable 
with the political aspects of European integra-
tion such as the United Kingdom and Sweden.
While Ireland had been struggling in the 
1950s, a major transformation had been tak-
ing place in Western Europe. Rising from the 
ashes of the war, the elites in France, West 
Germany and Italy, encouraged by the United 
States through its Marshal Plan, decided that 
future peace and prosperity could only be 
guaranteed by economic integration. In 1952, 
the six countries of France, Italy, West Ger-
many, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg 
placed their coal and steel industries under the 
control of a supranational authority. This was 
a revolutionary development at the time as 
coal and steel were seen as the raw materials of 
both economic and military power.
A more ambitious plan to create a Europe-
an Political and Defence Community failed in 
1954 when it was rejected by the French Na-
tional Assembly. However, this did not deter 
the “founding fathers” of European integra-
tion such as Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, 
Spaak and De Gasperi. They immediately be-
gan the push for an Economic Community and 
this was agreed, with EURATOM, an atomic 
energy union, in Rome in March 1957. Brit-
ain, having been invited to the negotiations of 
these treaties, withdrew from them. Nobody in 
Ireland or Europe seriously considered Ireland 
as a candidate for membership.
The key elements of the EEC remain the 
central features of the European Union. Policy 
is driven by an independent Commission while 
decisions are taken by the Member States in 
the Council, often by majority voting and by 
the European Parliament. The European Court 
of Justice ensures that all of the actors play by 
the rules. Pure economic policies such as free 
trade and freedom of movement for capital and 
labour are flanked by common social policies 
to avoid social dumping, convergence policies 
to assist less developed regions, common agri-
cultural and fisheries policies to ensure food 
security and rural development and a common 
trade policy to ensure that Europe speaks with 
one voice in world trade negotiations. Over the 
years a wide range of other policies have been 
added. The EU as it is now called has common 
foreign and security policies and highly devel-
oped environmental policies.
The EEC proved to be a major impetus for 
growth in Europe. While the UK continued 
to struggle to find sustainable growth, the six 
members of the EEC made very rapid econom-
ic progress. Nothing succeeds like success and 
by 1961, the United Kingdom had begun to re-
consider its rejection of the EEC. Ireland, by 
now fully committed to its new economic pol-
icy, applied for membership on 31 July 1961. 
Unfortunately, however the “six” founding 
members of the EEC were not convinced that 
Ireland was economically or politically ready 
for membership and the then Taoiseach, Sean 
Lemass, had to lobby intensively in each of 
their capitals before we were invited to begin 
negotiations. In any event, Charles De Gaulle 
vetoed Britain’s application in 1963, giving 
Ireland more time to prepare. Indeed Britain, 
Ireland and Denmark had to await the arrival 
of President Pompidou as president of France 
in 1969 before accession negotiations began in 
earnest.
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In the 1960s, Ireland continued to grow and 
to invest in its own development. Its experi-
ence of the Anglo Irish Free Trade Agreement 
of 1965, confirmed it in its view that free trade 
on its own would not suffice. This agreement 
which did help open up the economy, was sup-
posed to ensure free trade between the two 
countries, but Britain, which suffered a num-
ber of foreign exchange crises at that time, 
unilaterally imposed currency restrictions on 
Irish exporters to Britain. Unlike in the EEC, 
there was no supranational Commission and 
no Court of Justice to enforce the agreement, 
and the Irish Government had no choice but 
to accept the British measure.
Ireland joined the EEC, today’s European 
Union, on 1 January 1973, following a na-
tional referendum, in which 83.1% voted in 
favour. The Norwegians rejected membership 
at that time, and Ireland, with Denmark and 
the United Kingdom turned the “six” into the 
“nine”.
While membership of the EU transformed 
Ireland’s foreign and economic policy, it was 
not an immediate success in economic terms. 
Following a decade and a half of strong eco-
nomic and population growth up to 1973, Ire-
land was rocked by two oil crises, a slowing in 
reform and the negative results of auction pol-
itics. By 1986, the national debt was reaching 
unsustainable levels, unemployment was over 
17% and emigration had once again reached 
a very high level. In 1987, a new Government 
adopted stringent measures to control govern-
ment spending, to reform the public service 
and to revive the industrial capacity of the 
country. It was greatly helped in doing so by 
world economic conditions and a revival in 
the fortunes of the EU.
The EU itself had gone through a period 
of Eurosclerosis in the 1980s but with the ap-
pointment of Jacques Delors as President of the 
European Commission in 1985 and the strong 
support of Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germa-
ny and President Francois Mitterand of France, 
the EU found a new sense of direction. In short 
order the Single European Act and the Maas-
tricht Treaties were agreed, laying the ground-
work for the “single market” and the euro. You 
might well ask, why the EU needed to create 
a “single market” in 1992 more than 30 years 
after such a market was, in theory at least, cre-
ated in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The an-
swer of course is that the first wave of meas-
ures concentrated mainly on the abolition of 
tariffs between the member states. This left a 
myriad of other measures which had the ef-
fect of controlling trade. The Single European 
Act allowed these measures to be adopted by a 
qualified majority of member states. This cut 
through years of delay and the Single Market 
created a new impetus for Europe. In addition 
to the Single Market, the European Union in-
creased and streamlined its convergence and 
cohesion funding for less developed regions. 
This funding was focused on productive in-
vestment in physical and human infrastruc-
ture and assisted Ireland in taking advantage 
of the single market.
In the 1990s, the EU also began to reform 
its common Agricultural policy.
This policy had helped Ireland downsize the 
number of farms without social upheaval but 
had become extremely costly with the creation 
of milk lakes and butter mountains.
The new European frameworks combined 
with national policies saw Ireland grow at an 
unprecedented rate. From 1995 to 2000, GDP 
growth rate ranged between 7.8 and 11.5%; 
it then slowed to between 4.4 and 6.5% from 
2001 to 2007. During that period, the Irish 
GDP per capita rose dramatically to equal, 
then eventually surpass, that of all but one 
state in Western Europe. In 1999, Ireland 
joined the euro zone and the Irish pound was 
replaced by the euro in January 2002. This 
enabled Ireland to borrow at historically low 
interest rates.
Unfortunately, however, the Celtic Tiger 
years came to a dramatic end. The global fi-
nancial crisis revealed fundamental weak-
nesses in the Irish banking system. A boom in 
property and asset prices had been fuelled by 
irresponsible lending. The Irish Government 
was forced to nationalise the entire national 
banking system and to liquidate a number of 
banks at a very heavy cost. Over the years 2008 
to 2011 unemployment trebled to over 15%, 
net emigration returned, the national debt 
rose to over 100% of GDP and GDP itself fell 
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by over 10%. Following over two years of ef-
forts to tackle the crisis on its own resources, 
on the evening of 21 November 2010, Ireland 
formally requested financial support from the 
European Union’s European Financial Stabil-
ity Facility (EFSF) and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF). It did so with great reluc-
tance, but had no other choice as there was a 
real prospect that the banks would not be able 
to give out money if international help was not 
availed of.
A €67.5 billion “bailout” was put in place by 
the EU, other European countries (via the Eu-
ropean Financial Stability Facility fund and bi-
lateral loans) and the IMF as part of an overall 
total €85 billion “programme”.
The Irish State assigned €17.5 billion to 
this “bailout;” an amount that was equal to the 
Total Discretionary Portfolio of the National 
Pensions Reserve Fund. As part of the terms 
and conditions of the “Bailout Programme”, 
the Irish government agreed to a range of 
cost cutting and revenue increasing measures 
aimed at bringing Ireland’s public finances un-
der control. These terms and conditions con-
tinued to be met when a change of government 
occurred in March 2011 after the general elec-
tion. By August 2011, total funding for the six 
Irish banks by the ECB and the Irish Central 
Bank came to about €150 billion. This is an 
enormous figure by any standards.
Needless to say there was a very vigorous 
political debate about the bailout and in the 
2011 general election the then Fianna Fail/
Green Government lost three quarters of their 
parliamentary seats. To put this is context the 
Fianna Fail vote dropped to 17% of the nation-
al vote. In no election since 1932 had Fianna 
Fail received less than 39% of the vote.
There were those who advocated default 
and leaving the euro. However the new Gov-
ernment, with strong popular support commit-
ted to the bailout programme, and last Decem-
ber, following a number of very difficult years, 
Ireland left the “bail out” without recourse 
to contingency funding. And the economy is 
now recovering. The economy and asset pric-
es are growing again. Ireland is borrowing at 
very low interest rates. Indeed last week, we 
were able to borrow at negative rates. We have 
staunched the bleeding from the banks. Em-
ployment is growing and unemployment is 
falling, albeit still over 11%.
The EU itself has learned from its mistakes. 
Banking regulation has been tightened up as 
has economic coordination amongst the mem-
ber states. While the euro zone continues to 
suffer anaemic growth, it is hoped that it too 
will resume its growth path in the near future. 
What is clear is that without the assistance of 
the EU, Ireland would have had to undergo an 
economic adjustment which could be com-
pared to undergoing surgery without an an-
aesthetic.
Even after the recent crisis, Ireland remains 
a prosperous country. It has the 18th highest 
GDP per capita in the world.
Independent studies rank Ireland first in 
the world for inward investment by quality 
and value, and as the best country in West-
ern Europe in which to invest. We rank first 
in the world for the flexibility and adaptabil-
ity of our workforce, and third in the world 
for the availability of skilled labour. We have a 
young, highly-educated workforce in the only 
English-speaking country within the Euro 
zone, with barrier-free access to 500 million 
consumers. Dublin is ranked as the best city in 
the world for human capital.
Our agri-food sector is performing particu-
larly strongly, increasing exports by 40% since 
2009 to reach a value of almost €10 billion in 
2013.
Over 1000 overseas companies have chosen 
Ireland as their strategic base in Europe. 8 of 
the top 10 global ICT firms, 9 of the world’s 
top 10 pharmaceutical firms, and all 10 of the 
largest online companies in the world oper-
ate from Ireland. During 2013, major invest-
ments in Ireland were announced by Deutsche 
Bank, Twitter, EMC, eBay, Salesforce, Novartis, 
Vistakon, Facebook, Zurich, Symantec, De Puy, 
Yahoo, Sanofi and Indeed.com.
The same factors which draw overseas firms 
to Ireland make our indigenous enterprises 
and start-ups among the most dynamic and in-
novative in the world. Employment in Irish ex-
porting companies grew strongly in 2013, and 
Irish innovation in sectors such as information 
technology, medical devices and engineering is 
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changing and enhancing people’s lives around 
the world, every day.
CONCLUSION
I would suggest three lessons from this ac-
count.
First a small open economy like Ireland has 
benefited greatly from membership of the EU. 
In purely monetary terms Ireland received 
net contributions from the EU of more than 
40 billion euro between 1973 and 2007 inclu-
sive. But more important perhaps is the fact 
that it has enabled Ireland to access the Euro-
pean Market as an equal. It has allowed Ireland 
to bridge the development gap with Western 
Europe that it had experienced for centuries. 
It has also enabled and indeed at times com-
pelled, Ireland to modernise its public services 
and private enterprise.
Second, EU membership of course is not a 
panacea. We have twice in our membership of 
the EU lost our way economically, in the 1980s 
and in the last six years. EU membership will 
not in itself save a country from poor policy 
choices and their consequences. But EU mem-
bership and membership of the euro has ena-
bled Ireland to weather and recover from these 
storms.
Third, EU membership, is not a charitable 
enterprise. The fundamental driving force 
underpinning the EU is mutual self interest. 
There was no question, for instance, of the EU 
giving Ireland a blank cheque when its banks 
were on the point of collapse. The assistance 
was subject to tough conditions, just as our 
initial access to the EU entailed making dif-
ficult changes in the structure of our industry. 
But the key point is that the EU policies are 
not imposed from above but hammered out by 
the member states in Brussels. The EU is a col-
laborative body.
That can lead to much frustration. There 
are no easy decisions in the EU. There is no 
one person such a President, or indeed no one 
institution, such as a Parliament, which can 
decide on policy. Every decision has to be ne-
gotiated through a complex process. Many say 
indeed, that the EU is like a bumble bee. Un-
der the laws of aerodynamics, the bumble bee 
should not be able to fly but it does. From the 
outside, the EU should not be able to work but 
it does. And it has had its reverses both at the 
European and national level. The Irish public, 
for instance, rejected two European Treaties at 
the first time of asking in a referendum.
However, it has, on the whole been an out-
standing success. It has for instance been a key 
stabilising factor in Eastern Europe by giving 
the peoples of the post communist states a Eu-
ropean perspective. While it now faces chal-
lenges such as anaemic growth and immigra-
tion, it has a proven track record of meeting 
challenges successfully. I have every confi-
dence that it will continue to do so.
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